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POLICE USING PHOTOSHOP TO ALTER A
SUSPECT’S PHOTO IN LINEUP AND COURTS
ALLOWING IT: DOES IT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS?
Molly Eyerman +
In criminal investigations, about 80,000 eyewitness identifications occur each
year. 1 Eyewitness identifications regularly serve as crucial evidence in criminal
investigations and trials. 2 Police obtain this evidence through different
eyewitness identification procedures, such as physical lineups, show-ups, and
photo arrays. 3 Despite the prevalence of eyewitness identification evidence,
experts attribute the high rates of wrongful convictions to eyewitness
misidentifications resulting from poorly administered procedures. 4 To reduce
this danger, an increasing number of law enforcement agencies have gradually
started implementing expert recommendations into their eyewitness
identification procedure policies with the goal of administering more reliable
and fairer procedures. 5
One procedure agencies began to improve were photo arrays, also known as
photo lineups, photo-spreads, photo-montages, or six-packs. 6 Photo arrays are
the most commonly used identification procedure in the United States. 7
Typically, the procedure involves an officer showing an eyewitness “only one
J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2021; B.A.
Communication Studies & B.S. Sociology, Virginia Tech, 2016. The author thanks Susan McEvoy
for her valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this Comment. The author also thanks the staff and
editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their help in preparing this Comment for
publication. Finally, the author thanks her family for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 451, 457 (2012).
2. Id. at 458.
3. See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615,
616–18, 628 (2006).
4. Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT [hereinafter INNOCENCE
PROJECT], https://innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-identification-reform/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2021).
5. See Rebecca Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification
Reform and the Role of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535, 537 (2013).
6. See Gary L. Wells et al., Policy and Procedure Recommendations for the Collection and
Preservation of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 44 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 7–9, 28 (2020)
(summarizing eyewitness identification research and current American Psychological Association
recommendations).
7. A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification Procedures in Law Enforcement Agencies,
POLICE EXEC. RES. F. 58 (2013) [hereinafter National Survey], https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/242617.pdf (finding that around ninety-four percent of police departments use
photo arrays); see also David A. Fahrenthold, Police Lineups Falling Out of Favor, WASH. POST
(Apr. 19, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/04/19/police-lineupsfalling-out-of-favor/99d1070d-38c6-458b-a3e5-c994b77c8876/.
+
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[photograph of a] suspect (who might or might not be the culprit) and the
remaining lineup [photos] are fillers.” 8 A “filler is a known innocent person
who is in the lineup to help make the procedure fair” and physically resembles
the suspect. 9 Fillers help lessen the suggestiveness of the procedure because a
suspect’s photo remains indifferent, thus failing to draw an eyewitness’s
attention to the suspect’s photo. 10 To find fillers, police often input the suspect’s
traits into “a computer-generated program,” which then produces “a compilation
of similar photographs based on the suspect’s photograph.” 11 If an eyewitness
describes a culprit as having a distinctive trait, such as facial hair, a tattoo, or a
scar, police will sometimes add this feature to the filler photos by using photoediting software. 12 However, such a trait will be included in an array only if an
eyewitness initially described this trait. 13 If an eyewitness fails to initially
describe the culprit as having such features, police may “photoshop” it—i.e.,
digitally edit the suspect’s photo—by removing these distinguishing features,
and use this modified photo in the array. 14
Despite recent reform efforts to improve the fairness and reliability of photo
arrays, researchers still criticize the identifications resulting from this
procedure. 15 Many scholars and legal experts find that photo arrays, especially
those improperly and suggestively administered by police, are primary

8. See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures
and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 1, 7 (2009).
9. Id.
10. Id. “[A] . . . reason for using fillers is to help ensure that the procedure is not suggestive
of which person is the focus of the police investigation. Accordingly, the qualities of these fillers
are presumed to be critical to maintaining low levels of suggestiveness.” Id.
11. State v. Frazier, 60 N.E.3d 633, 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs,
The Police Photoshopped His Mug Shot for a Lineup. He’s Not the Only One, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/24/us/police-photoshop-tattoos.html.
12. Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11; Antonia Noori Farzan, Witnesses Didn’t Say a Bank
Robber Had Facial Tattoos. So Police Digitally Altered a Suspect’s Mugshot, WASH. POST (Aug.
19, 2019, 11:49 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/19/portland-bank-robberfacial-tattoos-photoshop-mug-shot/; see also Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Eyewitness Identification: Procedure for Conducting Photo Arrays 9 (Jan.
6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/file/923201/download (recommending adding distinctive
features to fillers to create fairer lineups and arrays).
13. Eyewitness Identification Task Force, Report, 2019 Report of The United States Court of
Appeals for The Third Circuit Task Force On Eyewitness Identifications, 92 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 37–
38 (2019).
14. Maxine Bernstein, The Case of the Missing Tattoos: Altered Photo Lineup by Portland
Police Draws Objection, THE OREGONIAN (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/
2019/08/the-case-of-the-missing-tattoos-altered-photo-lineup-by-portland-police-drawsobjection.html; Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11.
15. See Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11 (discussing a 2016 study in which researchers found
that “witnesses were more likely to identify [someone with a distinctive feature] as the
perpetrator”).
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contributors to wrongful convictions. 16 Some researchers claim that reform
efforts—for example, digitally editing photos—do not increase reliability, while
proponents counter that “allowing police departments to incorporate eyewitness
identification procedures developed through improved technology” does
increase reliability. 17 Although technology like Photoshop allows for an
efficient way to create and conduct photo arrays, this advancement does not
necessarily protect a criminal defendant’s due process rights. 18 When law
enforcement digitally alters a suspect’s photograph by removing distinct facial
features, includes this modified photo in an array, presents the array to an
eyewitness, and ultimately secures an identification, the suspect’s due process
rights are violated.
This Comment first summarizes the history of the eyewitness identification in
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and its current test to determine whether an
eyewitness identification procedure violated due process. Next, this Comment
examines how lower courts apply the Supreme Court’s due process test to
situations where altered photographs appear in photo arrays. Finally, this
Comment analyzes different scenarios where it would be appropriate to digitally
alter photos used in arrays, and how, when inappropriately done, such photos
will negatively impact criminal defendant’s rights.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has conceded that eyewitness misidentifications are a
“major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice.” 19
Yet, the Court has also recognized the important role eyewitness identifications
play in criminal investigations and has not completely disallowed this
evidence. 20 The Court instead has balanced these considerations when forming
its due process analysis for eyewitness identification procedures. 21

16. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 4 (finding that eyewitness misidentifications
“contributed to approximately 69% of the more than 375 wrongful convictions in the United States
overturned by post-conviction DNA evidence”); see also Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, The
Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6
WYO. L. REV. 189, 190–91 (2006) (finding that about 10,000 people a year are wrongfully
convicted primarily because of mistaken identifications).
17. Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to
Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 613–14 (2009); Carrie Leonetti, Showing Up:
Eyewitness-Identification Requirements in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Comparative Case Study,
119 PENN ST. L. REV. 439, 476–77 (2014).
18. See Bernstein, supra note 14.
19. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
20. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198–99 (1972).
21. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 241–42 (2012) (discussing the need to deter
law enforcement’s use of suggestive procedures while still providing the jury with reliable
identification evidence).
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A. The Wade Trilogy: The Beginning of Eyewitness Identification Precedents
The Court first attempted to fix the dangers of eyewitness misidentifications
in the 1967 trilogy of cases: United States v. Wade, 22 Gilbert v. California, 23 and
Stovall v. Denno. 24 In Wade, the Court acknowledged that post-indictment
physical lineups are “peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable
factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.” 25 If a
defendant’s attorney is absent from a post-indictment physical lineup, a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is severely harmed because this
right attaches at all “critical” stages of criminal procedure. 26 Thus, the Court
concluded that identification evidence obtained from physical lineups conducted
after indictment, where a defendant’s counsel was absent, must be excluded. 27
In the second case, Gilbert v. California, a criminal defendant convicted of
robbery also had no counsel present at a post-indictment lineup and the
defendant was identified in-court by multiple eyewitnesses. 28 An issue before
the Court was to decide “what relief is required by application to this case of the
principles today announced in United States v. Wade.” 29 The Court held that
“[t]he admission of the in-court identifications without first determining that
they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent origin was
constitutional error[,]” and, like in Wade, the Court remanded “to afford the
State the opportunity to establish that the in-court identifications had an
independent source, or that their introduction in evidence was in any event
harmless error.” 30 Thus, although an eyewitness identification procedure may
be improper, the identification evidence still can be admissible if it had an
independent basis. 31
In the third case, Stovall v. Denno, the Court recognized that eyewitness
identification evidence might also threaten due process rights. 32 In Stovall, the
Court faced the question of whether a victim’s identification of a defendant
resulting from a show-up conducted at the hospital violated due process. 33 After
22. Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
23. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
24. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
26. Id. at 224, 226–27. “[I]n this case it is urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup
was indispensable to protect Wade’s most basic right as a criminal defendant—his right to a fair
trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.” Id. at 223–24.
27. Id. at 237.
28. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 269–70.
29. Id. at 269.
30. Id. at 272.
31. Wade, 388 U.S. at 242. If an independent basis existed, the state could offer in-court
identifications as evidence if it came from a source that was separate from the improper procedure.
Id.; see generally Garrett, supra note 1, at 465–67 (criticizing the admissibility of identification
evidence at trial under this independent basis test).
32. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967).
33. Id. at 296.
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criticizing “[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose
of identification, and not as part of a lineup” as inherently suggestive, the Court
determined that a “violation of due process of law in the conduct of confrontation
depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” 34 While the
procedure at issue was “unnecessarily suggestive,” the Court held that the
defendant was not denied due process because the procedure was not “conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification.” 35 Looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the Court held that the exigency involved allowed police to bring
the defendant to the victim’s hospital room, so she could view him before going
into surgery. 36 Thus, the Court adopted a totality of the circumstances approach
as the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of eyewitness identification
evidence. 37
B. Developing the Totality Approach
The Court subsequently applied Stovall’s totality approach to identifications
resulting from photo arrays. 38 In Simmons v. United States, FBI agents
investigated a bank robbery and suspected Simmons as one of the robbers. 39 The
agents obtained photos of the suspects and presented them to five eyewitnesses,
all of whom positively identified Simmons. 40 Based on this evidence, the jury
convicted Simmons. 41
Simmons appealed, arguing that the “pretrial
identification by means of photographs was in the circumstances so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him due
process of law . . . .” 42 While the Court acknowledged the “hazards of initial
identification by photograph,” it did not wish to stop photo identification
procedures entirely. 43 Rather, the Court explained:
[E]ach case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions
based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if
the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly

34. Id. at 302.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
39. Id. at 380–81.
40. Id. at 382. The photos were “mostly . . . group photographs of Andrews, Simmons, and
others.” Id. The photos “were shown to the five bank employees who had witnessed the robbery .
. . [and were] exhibited to each employee separately.” Id.
41. Id. at 381.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 384 (“We are unwilling to prohibit [the] employment [of photo arrays], either in the
exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement.”).
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suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. 44
To determine if the array was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification[,]” the Court
considered the police procedure, analyzing how many photos the officers used,
how the police presented photos to eyewitnesses, if police highlighted a
particular suspect, or if officers indicated to witnesses that other evidence
pointed to the suspect. 45 Using these factors, the Court held the photo lineup in
Simmons was not impermissibly suggestive and did not violate due process. 46
After Simmons, the Court examined a “case present[ing] a compelling
example of unfair lineup procedures” in Foster v. California. 47 In Foster, police
conducted a physical lineup as part of its investigation of a bank robbery. 48 The
lineup was comprised of Foster, the only participant wearing clothes similar to
the robber, next to two noticeably shorter men. 49 The eyewitness did not identify
anyone as the robber, but he asked to speak to Foster alone, and police allowed
it. 50 Days later, police conducted another lineup with the same eyewitness. 51
Foster was the only participant who appeared in both lineups, and the witness
identified him as the robber. 52 Foster appealed his conviction arguing these
procedures violated his constitutional rights. 53 The Court agreed and found that
the procedures had “suggestive elements . . . [that] made it all but inevitable that
[the witness] would identify petitioner. . . . This procedure so undermined the
reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process.”54 The
Court reversed Foster’s conviction and held that because an unsure eyewitness
only became sure after multiple suggestive procedures, all identification
evidence should be excluded. 55
C. “Reliability is the Linchpin”: Court Favors Reliability Over Totality
Concerned that its previous rulings would create a per se exclusion rule of all
eyewitness identification evidence, the Court added reliability factors in Neil v.
Biggers. 56 At issue was whether a show-up conducted by police, along with the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 384–85.
Id. at 384.
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 (1969).
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 443–44.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198–200 (1972).
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victim’s identification of the defendant as her rapist, was permissible. 57 Instead
of relying solely on the totality test, the Court created a two-step inquiry to
determine if an “identification and the circumstances surrounding it failed to
comport with due process requirements.” 58 First, courts must assess the
suggestiveness of the procedure to ensure that it did not result in “a . . .
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 59 If the procedure was
not unnecessarily suggestive, then the identification is admissible. 60 However,
if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, then courts must examine, under
the “totality of the circumstances[,]” whether the identifications can overcome
the unnecessarily suggestive nature of the procedure. 61 When examining this
second inquiry, the Court identified the following five factors:
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention, [3]
the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the
criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation. 62
If, after weighing these factors, a court finds the identification reliable, then it is
admissible despite the procedure’s suggestive nature. 63
The Court adopted these factors in Manson v. Brathwaite. 64 In Manson, the
Court faced the question of whether an undercover police officer’s identification
of the defendant as a drug dealer was unnecessarily suggestive when the officer
identified him after looking at one picture of the defendant while alone. 65
Though finding that the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the Court
affirmed the conviction because the identification was likely reliable. 66 The
Court concluded “that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility
of identification testimony[,]” and “the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself” must be weighed against the Biggers’ factors. 67 By
emphasizing reliability, the Court anticipated that reliable eyewitness

57. Id. at 195–96.
58. Id. at 196.
59. Id. at 198 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)) (“[T]he primary
evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’”).
60. Id. at 199.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 199–200.
63. Id. at 199–201.
64. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
65. Id. at 99, 101.
66. Id. at 109 (“‘[T]he procedure in the instant case was suggestive [because only one
photograph was used] and unnecessary’ [because there was no emergency or exigent
circumstance].”).
67. Id. at 114.
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identification evidence could be admissible while also deterring impermissible
identification procedures. 68
The Court revisited the Manson reliability test in Perry v. New Hampshire. 69
In Perry, the Court faced whether an unintentional viewing of the suspect
violated due process when the witness “pointed to her kitchen window and said
the person she saw breaking into [the] car was standing in the parking lot, next
to the police officer,” though she failed to identify him in a subsequent policearranged photo array. 70 The Court concluded that because “the identification
was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law
enforcement,” a due process analysis was unnecessary and the conviction was
affirmed. 71 Thus, the Manson due process test “comes into play only after the
defendant establishes improper police conduct,” 72 and remains the current test
today.
II. LOWER COURT RULINGS ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE FROM
PHOTO ARRAYS
When federal courts face issues of identification permissibility, all turn to the
two-prong Manson standard and apply the Biggers factors to some degree. 73
Conversely, state courts differ in their due process analysis for eyewitness
identification evidence. 74 Some reject Manson completely and only apply the
Stovall totality approach, while others have diminished the Biggers factors. 75
No matter what, lower courts will apply a due process test when faced with
improper police identification procedures. 76 Still, these tests are heavily

68. Id. at 112 (“The police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures under the
totality rule . . . .”).
69. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238 (2012).
70. Id. at 234.
71. Id. at 248.
72. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
73. See Gambell, supra note 16, at 207–08 (“All circuit courts also appear to apply the five
Biggers factors, but they are split on whether the Supreme Court intended the Biggers factors to be
exclusive.”).
74. Thomas D. Albright & Brandon L. Garrett, The Law and Science of Eyewitness Evidence,
DUKE L. SCH. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY SERIES NO. 2020-62, 5-6 (2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675055.
75. See Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Manson and its Progeny: An Empirical Analysis of
American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 175, 191 (2012); see also
Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, Beyond Manson and Lukolongo: A Critique of American and Zambian
Eyewitness Law with Recommendations for Reform in the Developing World, 20 FLA. J. OF INT’L
L., 279, 301 (2008) (“Additionally, of the five states that have rejected Manson, three adopted
formulations similar to the Stovall holding, believing that test to be more protective of due process
rights.”); Gambell, supra note 16, at 211 (noting some state courts “have been more willing to
disagree with Biggers factors if they appear scientifically outdated”).
76. See Leonetti, supra note 17, at 456.
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criticized for allowing broad interpretations of what a permissible procedure is,
including altering photos in arrays. 77
A. Determining if Physically Drawing on Photos in an Array Violates Due
Process
Before addressing digital alterations in photo arrays, lower courts had to settle
the issue of police physically drawing on photos used in arrays as possible due
process violations. 78 Whether this conduct was impermissibly suggestive
depended on if the court analyzed the identification procedure under the totality
or the reliability approach.
For instance, in People v. Slutts, the California Court of Appeal applied the
totality approach to an identification resulting from an array containing a photo
that was physically modified by a police officer. 79 The officer showed a witness
a photo array where “[n]one of the persons shown in the photographs wore a
beard or a mustache[,]” an initial detail the first witness told police. 80 The officer
then drew a beard and mustache on the defendant’s photograph after the first
witness selected his photo. 81 When the officer conducted a photo array with the
second eyewitness, the drawn-on photo remained and was the only altered photo
in the array, and this witness selected his photo. 82
The Slutts court ultimately held that “the method used by [the officer] to
procure the identification of defendant was fair as to [the first eyewitness], but
unfair as to [the second one].” 83 It reasoned that the procedure would have been
permissible if the officer “sketched beards on all of the photographs[,]” or if she
obtained an unmarked photograph of the suspect before presenting the photo
array to the second witness. 84 By presenting the second witness with an
obviously altered photograph, “[t]here could be no doubt in [the second
witness’] mind which man [the officer] suspected.” 85 By showing the witness

77. Id. at 455–56.
78. See People v. Slutts, 66 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865–66 (Ct. App. 1968) (drawing mustaches on
array photo was suggestive). But see People v. Colon, 805 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (drawing facial hair on all array photos was not unduly suggestive); State v. Simpson, No.
25163, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1585, at *12 (Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2013) (drawing hats on all photos
in the array was not suggestive); Tinsley v. State, No. 01-17-00296-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS
8732, at *5–6 (App. Oct. 25, 2018) (drawing hat and glasses on all photos was permissible).
79. Slutts, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Notably, this case was decided before Manson. Id. at 862.
80. Id. at 864.
81. Id. The eyewitness picked the defendant’s photo because he “most closely resemble[ed]
the man she had seen,” but at trial, she “refused to make a positive identification.” Id. at 864–65.
82. Id. at 864.
83. Id. at 865.
84. Id. at 865–66.
85. Id. at 866.
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one altered photograph, in an array of otherwise unaltered photographs, the
identification procedure violated due process. 86
Alternatively, the reliability approach was used in State v. Simpson. 87 In
Simpson, the defendant argued that a detective drawing hats on all the
photographs in a photo array violated due process. 88 The detective justified the
drawings as a way to make the array “more uniform . . . because [the defendant]
had an irregular scar on his hairline where hair would not grow. [The detective]
feared that leaving the scar uncovered would attract attention to [the
defendant’s] photo.” 89 The Ohio Court of Appeals agreed and held that, under
the first prong of the Manson test, the drawn hats were not impermissibly
suggestive. 90
B. Determining if Digitally Editing a Photo in an Array Violates Due Process
With the advancement of technology in eyewitness identification procedures,
courts began facing the issue of police digitally modifying a suspect’s
photograph. 91 In such cases, courts struggle to determine whether police
digitally altering photos in arrays is a permissible or impermissible procedure.
1. Digitally Adding Facial Features and Clothing
Sometimes police will “retouch” photographs by making the array photos
more similar to how the culprit looked when committing the crime. 92 For
instance, the police in United States v. Dunbar showed witnesses an “array
containing six photographs, each retouched to show the suspect with a beard and
86. Id. While using the drawn-on photo in the second array violated due process, the court
ultimately held this error was harmless, and thus did not require reversal of the conviction. Id.
87. State v. Simpson, No. 25163, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1585, at *6–7 (Ct. App. Apr. 26,
2013).
88. Id. at *6–7, *12.
89. Id. at *12.
90. Id. (reasoning that drawing a hat to cover a visible scar prevented defendant’s photo from
standing out).
91. See generally United States v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1111–14 (D. Or. 2019) (using
Photoshop to remove facial and neck tattoos from defendant’s photo only); United States v. Ellis,
121 F. Supp. 3d 927, 934, 944–45 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (analyzing digital addition of sweatshirts to all
array photos); Juarez v. Stainer, No. CV 11-10410-GW (RZ), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177675, at
*5–7, *9–15 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012) (discussing digital addition of beanies to all array photos);
Chavez v. Gipson, No. CV 11-7356 AG (FFM), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174099, at *17–26 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 27, 2012) (examining digital alteration of facial hair to suspect’s photo only to match
filler photos); United States v. Martinez, No. 11-16-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at *6–
26 (D. Del. July 25, 2012) (using Photoshop to remove facial tattoo from defendant’s photo); People
v. Butler, 33 N.Y.S.3d 602, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (adding digital facial tattoos to filler photos
only); Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 643–47 (Tex. App. 2015) (removing defendant’s facial
tattoos with Photoshop); Garza v. State, No. 03-06-00216-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7004, at *2–
8 (App. Sep. 19, 2008) (adding facial tattoos to filler photos only).
92. See Connie Mayer, Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Based on
Pretrial Photographic Arrays, 13 PACE L. REV. 815, 843 (1994).
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cap exactly like the one in the surveillance photograph.” 93 The witnesses
selected the defendant, and he was convicted and subsequently appealed. 94 The
Third Circuit Court affirmed because “each photograph was altered in the same
way and, if anything, the alteration increased the reliability of the [witnesses’]
identification[s].” 95
Similarly, a California district court held in United States v. Ellis that the
police department’s use of Adobe Photoshop to add a black-hooded sweatshirt
to all the photographs in the array did not violate due process. 96 While
investigating a shooting, officers showed the victim, another police officer,
multiple photo arrays. 97 The victim “requested that black hooded sweatshirts be
added over the faces because the third assailant wore a hoodie that covered his
face throughout the duration of the shooting.” 98 After the sweatshirts were
added, the victim selected the defendant as one of the shooters. 99 The defendant
argued that this identification evidence resulted from an impermissibly
suggestive procedure. 100 However, the court found “the fact that hoods were
added to all the photos in the . . . photo array made the identification procedure
more reliable, not suggestive.” 101 The court concluded that “[e]ven if the . . .
photo array was somehow suggestive, . . . the identification was nonetheless
reliable under the factors set forth in Neil v. Biggers . . . .” 102
2. Digitally Altering Suspect’s Facial Characteristics
Besides digitally adding clothing to photos, courts also hear cases involving
digital modifications of photographs that add or remove a suspect’s facial
features. 103 In United States v. Martinez, a detective prepared a photo array to
see if an eyewitness to a robbery could identify the suspect as one of the
robbers. 104 When preparing the array, the officer “used the PhotoShop program

93. United States v. Dunbar, 767 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1985).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74.
96. Ellis, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 934, 944.
97. Id. at 934. The victim was shown five different photo arrays, each with only one suspect
and done on different days. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 944.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court further found that the undercover officer victim’s identification was reliable
because he “had close, albeit brief, contact with [the assailant] and provided details about his
appearance. More importantly, [the officer victim] demonstrated a high degree of attention and
was specially trained to observe details.” Id.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. 11-16-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at
*8–9 (D. Del. July 25, 2012).
104. Id. During an attempted robbery at a convenience store, two masked men’s faces were
uncovered during a fight with an eyewitness. Id. at *3–5. The witness described the armed robber
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to remove the tattoo from the [defendant’s] photograph” so his photo would not
stand out. 105 Police conducted two arrays with this photoshopped photo, and the
eyewitness eventually identified the defendant as a robber. 106 The Delaware
District Court applied the Manson test to both arrays. 107 Instead of focusing on
the permissibility of digitally altering the defendant’s photo, the court focused
on the officer’s interactions with the eyewitnesses. 108 The court held that,
although one of the lineups was suggestive, none were unnecessarily suggestive;
thus, due process was not violated. 109 Though it was unnecessary for the court
to analyze the second prong of the Manson test, it concluded that the defendant
failed to show how such a procedure “created a ‘very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification,’” and the five factors “weigh[ed] strongly in favor
of denying [the defendant’s] motion” to suppress. 110
Similar to the Martinez holding, a Texas court in Solomon v. State held that
an officer’s use of Photoshop to remove a defendant’s facial tattoos and the
subsequent inclusion of that photo in an array was not impermissibly
suggestive. 111 In Solomon, police removed the facial tattoos from the
defendant’s photo because it “proved difficult” to find fillers similar to the
defendant’s appearance. 112 Instead of editing the filler photos to appear more
like the defendant, the officer “photo-shopped out the tattoos in appellant’s
photo, such that none of the six photos depicted persons with facial tattoos.” 113
An uninvolved officer subsequently presented this photo lineup to the witness,
who picked the defendant’s photo and responded, “I know he had tattoos, but I
don’t see tattoos on his face.” 114 The officer allegedly informed the witness that
all the photos had the individuals’ tattoos removed, and the witness then
as “a black male, late teens, approximately five-five, average to stocky build, wearing all black
clothing,” but never mentioned a facial tattoo. Id. at *6.
105. Id. at *8 n.3;see also People v. Butler, 33 N.Y.S.3d 602, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
(adding tattoo to filler photos so defendant’s photo did not stand out among fillers); Solomon v.
State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tex. App. 2015) (removing defendant’s facial tattoos to prevent his
photo from standing out); Garza v. State, No. 03-06-00216-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7004, at
*6 (App. Sept. 19, 2008) (adding facial tattoos to filler photos only).
106. Martinez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at *8–13. In the first photo array, the witness
selected the defendant’s photograph as “‘possibly’ [being] one of the robbers, but he could not be
sure.” Id. at *10. In the second lineup, the police kept the photoshopped photo of the defendant
and re-arranged the positions of the photos. Id. at *11–12.
107. Id. at *16, *24.
108. Id. at *17–23.
109. Id. at *18–22.
110. Id. at *24–25. The court reasoned that the eyewitness “had a good opportunity to view
his attacker[,]” gave a “detailed account of the robbery[,]” saw the robbers two times, and identified
the defendant on two separate occasions. Id. at *25–26.
111. Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tex. App. 2015). In this case, the eyewitness
was shot during a drug transaction and later identified the defendant as the shooter. Id. at 642–43.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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confidently identified the defendant. 115 The court held that the procedure was
not unnecessarily suggestive and did not give a high likelihood of
misidentification; rather, it made the lineup fairer. 116 Further, the court
explained that because the defendant offered “no authority that an officer is
precluded from removing distinguishing features when preparing a photo array,”
the photoshopping was also permissible. 117
The lack of authority prohibiting police from removing unique features also
contributed to the ruling in United States v. Allen. 118 In Allen, police received
information that Allen was responsible for several robberies and had worn makeup while committing them. 119 Detectives began to compile “a photo lineup that
included a recent booking photo of [Allen],” to show to eyewitnesses. 120
Because Allen’s tattoos were “visible in the original booking photo, . . . [the
detective] asked a technician to digitally alter the photo to remove the tattoos . .
. . The technician used photo editing software to disguise [Allen’s] tattoos . . .
.” 121 When police conducted the photo lineup, only two witnesses identified him
as the robber. 122 At a pre-trial motion to suppress the identifications, Allen
argued that the sole modification of his photo violated due process. 123 However,
the court denied the motion and held that the removal of Allen’s face and neck
tattoos from his mugshot was permissible. 124 The court recognized that no prior
case law existed regarding the issue of solely photoshopping a defendant’s photo
in an array. 125 The court reasoned that the photoshopping was not unnecessarily
suggestive and did not weaken the reliability of the identifications because:
[1], the method of editing Defendant’s photo was neutral. . .
. [2], at least one of the informants suggested to investigators
that Defendant was wearing makeup, and a witness
described seeing faint tattoos on the robber, as if they had
been covered. This information provide[d] an independent
justification for the investigator’s decision to alter
115. Id. at 645–46. The eyewitness said, “I’m a hundred percent sure this is the person that
shot me.” Id. at 644. At trial, he testified that the officer conducting the lineup told him that the
tattoos were removed. Id. at 645–46. The court held that the determination of whether such
statements were actually made was properly within the factfinder’s discretion, “because it turned
on the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.” Id. at 646.
116. Id. at 645, 647.
117. Id. at 645.
118. United States v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1111, 1114 (D. Or. 2019).
119. Id. at 1111.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1112.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1114; see also Bernstein, supra note 14.
125. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1113–14; see also Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tex.
App. 2015) (noting that the defendant provided no authority regarding the alteration of photos as a
prohibited practice).
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Defendant’s photograph . . . . [3], the photo lineup itself was
conducted double-blind to eliminate bias and suggestibility.
. . . [4], three of the four tellers identified Defendant’s
photograph as the bank robber with a reasonably high degree
of certainty. 126
While the court acknowledged that photoshopping can almost cross “the line
between constitutional and unconstitutional police conduct,” the court
concluded that the line was not crossed here. 127
III. IMPLICATIONS OF ALLOWING PHOTO ARRAYS WITH DIGITAL EDITS
The Supreme Court’s holdings on when eyewitness identification procedures
are impermissibly suggestive and likely to result in misidentification have been
broadly interpreted by lower courts to apply a “litmus test.” 128 United States v.
Allen, a 2019 case discussed above, demonstrates the broad application of the
Supreme Court’s expansive Manson test on identifications resulting from photo
arrays with digitally altered photos. 129
A. United States v. Allen: Highlighting Issues with Allowing Digital Edits to
Photos in Arrays
Allen demonstrates how police use photoshop to create lineups and how courts
analyze such lineups. 130 In this case, Allen was charged with multiple bank
robberies. 131 When police started their investigation, they asked multiple
eyewitnesses to describe the robber, and most described him as a middle-aged
black man wearing glasses, a hat, and a hoodie. 132 Investigators eventually
viewed surveillance footage of the robberies and determined that the same
person was involved in all of them. 133 Using the media, police asked the public
for help in identifying the robber and distributed a still from the security

126. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1114.
127. Id.
128. Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New
Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 109, 113 (2006) (“The Manson factors have become reduced to a checklist to determine
reliability, and a checklist is a poor means of making a subtle, fact-intensive, and case-specific
determination as to whether a given eyewitness identification is reliable, despite the use of
suggestive police procedures.”).
129. See generally Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1110.
130. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1114; see also Bernstein, supra note 14; Bogel-Burroughs, supra
note 11; Farzan, supra note 12; RJ Vogt, Tattoo Removal: Case Shines Light On Cop
Photoshopping, LAW360 (Aug. 25, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1192163.
131. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1112.
132. Id. at 1110–11.
133. Id. at 1110.
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footage. 134 Shortly afterward, police received tips that Allen was the robber and
had disguised himself. 135
About a month later, detectives prepared a photo array using a recent mugshot
of Allen that clearly depicted his facial tattoos. 136 Because Allen’s tattoos were
visible, a “technician used photo editing software to disguise [the] tattoos by
capturing [Allen]’s skin tone and painting over the tattoo as though he was
applying electronic makeup.” 137 However, none of the witnesses “mentioned
[the robber] having tattoos on his face. Tattoos weren’t visible on security
camera footage either.” 138 Of the four witnesses, only two identified Allen. 139
Allen filed a motion to suppress the identification evidence, but, as mentioned
earlier, it was denied. 140 While the court believed the removal of Allen’s tattoos
created a fairer lineup, “the concern here [was] that, in doing so, officers
potentially made the suspect look more like the witness’s memory of the culprit
(i.e., without tattoos),” increasing the risk of misidentification. 141 Additionally,
it was problematic that police never mentioned altering Allen’s photo to
witnesses or defense counsel until after discovery. 142 Thus, Allen’s case
“highlights the controversial but technically standard practice of police editing
lineup photographs . . . .” 143
B. Factors Courts Consider When Determining the Permissibility of Altered
Photos
When looking at whether digitally altering a defendant’s photo in an array
violates due process, lower courts, like the court in Allen, primarily adopt the
Manson “reliability is the linchpin” test. 144 Thus, the level of reliability is often

134. Id. at 1111.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Vogt, supra note 130.
139. Farzan, supra note 12.
140. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1115.
141. Vogt, supra note 130; see also Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11; Farzan, supra note 12.
142. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1111 n.1 (“This does not affect the outcome here, but a better
practice for the Government in the future would be for the technician or the case agent to create a
report describing the line-up and photo alteration process and to produce that report in discovery.”);
see also Bernstein, supra note 14; Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11; Farzan, supra note 12; Vogt,
supra note 130.
143. Vogt, supra note 130.
144. Allen, 419 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977));
accord United States v. Martinez, No. 11-16-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at *14–16 (D.
Del. July 25, 2012); Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 643 (Tex. App. 2015); see also Leonetti,
supra note 17, at 452 (“The focus of most cases involving challenges to an eyewitness identification
is the reliability of the identification, rather than the suggestiveness of the procedure . . . .”).
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the most important factor in a due process analysis. 145 As the Supreme Court
established in Manson, most lower courts apply the Biggers factors to determine
if identifications are likely reliable. 146 Such courts steadfastly hold these
variables as strong indicators of reliability, even though research has shown
otherwise. 147
Additionally, some courts examine how the procedures were conducted, such
as if the procedure was double-blind or if the witness’s confidence level was
recorded immediately afterward. 148 Some courts also consider whether law
enforcement instructed eyewitnesses before conducting a lineup, to make sure
that there was no suggestion that a suspect’s photo was in the lineup. 149
According to these courts, use of these methods in lineup procedures results in
more reliable results, which in turn affects how a court applies the Manson
test. 150
Ultimately, it seems the main reason that these lower courts find the use of
Photoshop permissible is that they believe this practice prevents the suspect’s
photo from standing out in a lineup. 151 As the Supreme Court noted, having a
photo stand out is an unnecessarily suggestive procedure and likely to lead to
misidentifications. 152 The impact of the Court’s underlying policy of fair and
proper lineups leads police to use methods like Photoshop to keep a defendant’s
distinct features from being the reason why witnesses are drawn to the suspect’s
photo—which is also why lower courts continue to rule that photoshopping does
not violate due process. 153 The tendency of lower courts allowing the use of
Photoshop will impact how police perform lineups, and will likely result in an
increase of misidentifications. The result will be overall harm to the integrity of
the judicial system.

145. See Leonetti, supra note 17, at 452–53 (noting that sometimes “identifications involve
police procedures that are unnecessarily suggestive, but which courts nonetheless find to have
resulted in sufficiently reliable identifications”).
146. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
147. Albright & Garrett, supra note 74, at 30 (“Nevertheless, courts have long treated the
confidence of an eyewitness as a marker of reliability, but in a manner not supported by scientific
research.”).
148. See id. at 44 (summarizing how a state court used different factors in analyzing reliability).
149. Mayer, supra note 92, at 832.
150. See Brian L. Cutler, Sources of Contamination in Lineup Identifications, 41 CHAMPION
16, 20–22 (2017).
151. People v. Butler, 33 N.Y.S.3d 602, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (removing tattoo was
permissible as it did not make defendant’s photo suggestive); Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641,
644–45 (“If anything, that action was favorable to appellant by removing distinguishing
characteristics.”).
152. See Foster v. California, 392 U.S. 440, 442 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384 (1968).
153. See United States v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1114 (D. Or. 2019); Solomon v. State,
469 S.W.3d 641, 644–45 (Tex. App. 2015).
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C. Photoshopped Array Photos May Result in Injustice
Misidentification has been a persistent problem in criminal law. 154 The
Supreme Court has been aware of misidentification as a dilemma and its
negative effect on justice. 155
For decades, scholars have researched
misidentification’s effects in the judicial system and also explored how more
accurate identifications can be procured from eyewitnesses. 156 With the
prevalence of misidentification, it makes sense that police would turn to
technology to help create fairer lineups. 157 However, when using technology
such as Photoshop, the police need to be cautious because altering photos may
affect the reliability of identifications.
If police remove distinct features from a suspect’s face with Photoshop, it
could lead to more misidentifications because witnesses could misremember
what the culprit looked like. It is a known fact that witness memory is fallible
and can lead to wrongful convictions. 158 If a witness sees the modified
photograph, he or she may begin to associate this photo with the culprit, and
eventually assume that the suspect was the culprit. 159 This could lead the witness
to later testify in court with confidence that the suspect was the culprit, even if
it was untrue. 160
Allowing such practices to continue will negatively impact the integrity of the
judicial process. If courts continue to hold that altering a defendant’s photo to
remove tattoos and other facial features is permissible, eventually police may
feel justified in altering other features as well. 161 As defense attorneys have
indicated, if courts continue to validate Photoshop as a way to obtain fairer
lineups, “there would presumably be nothing wrong with adjusting various
pixels to make someone’s face appear slimmer, so long as the government’s
154. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 4.
155. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
156. See Yates, supra note 12, at 2; see also Richard A. Wise et al., Criminal Law: A Tripartite
Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 850–51 (2007).
157. See National Survey, supra note 7, at 75 (“These technologies help law enforcement
agencies create more standardized lineups that incorporate more of the 1999 NIJ guidelines
regarding lineup composition.”).
158. See Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. iii (1999),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf (“Recent cases in which DNA evidence has been
used to exonerate individuals convicted primarily on the basis of eyewitness testimony have shown
us that eyewitness evidence is not infallible.”).
159. See Wise et al., supra note 156, at 852–53 (discussing the reasoning of eyewitnesses
during an identification procedure).
160. Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and
Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 774 (1995) (“[A]ctors in the legal system
can contaminate the confidence of an eyewitness in ways that can make an eyewitness’s in-court
expression of confidence a meaningless indicator of the goodness of the eyewitness’s memory.”).
161. See Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11 (noting that police digitally altering distinct features
could lead to them “alter[ing] photos in other ways, like making a suspect look thinner if they
believed that the person gained weight after committing a crime”).
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theory was that the suspect had gained weight since the crime.” 162 Police could
be influenced by courts’ broad rulings of what is permissible to alter suspect’s
photos by elongating noses, adding hair, or changing other facial structures, all
with the goal of obtaining identification evidence. If the court believes the
identification to be reliable, it may not matter that law enforcement significantly
changed the physical appearance of a suspect. Such a practice is concerning
because “officers [can] potentially [make] the suspect look more like the
witness’s memory of the culprit,” rather than the culprit himself. 163 If such
changes are made and identifications result, this could lead to an increase in
misidentifications and wrongful convictions, thus ultimately harming the
judicial system.
Additionally, although courts may hold that such a dangerous practice would
encroach on a defendant’s due process rights, courts may also retain the
reliability linchpin analysis from Manson—and ultimately admit it, finding that
even if the police applied such a technique, there is some other independent basis
for the identification. 164 By emphasizing the reliability factors, the courts lose
focus on the procedure itself and on whether the identification is actually
reliable. Rather, they focus primarily on the possible reasons why the
identifications may be reliable. 165 The courts do not see the dangerous precedent
being set by allowing identifications in a trial that result from arrays with
digitally modified photos of the suspect.
IV. WHEN PHOTOSHOPPING SHOULD BE PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE
While it is important that police avoid procedures where a suspect’s photo
stands out in a lineup, the removal of distinctive features introduces more
problems for due process than safeguards. 166 Though the primary focus of this
procedure is the removal of prominent features that will likely cause the suspect
to stand out, the lower courts’ broad interpretations of Manson could result in
police adopting practices of altering more than just superficial features on a
suspect’s photograph. Such a practice violates due process because it creates a
photograph that is inconsistent with a defendant’s appearance and thus actually
decreases the likelihood of a reliable identification.
A. When Photoshop is Permissible
As mentioned earlier, police departments utilize Photoshop in their
investigations. 167 While initially meant for crime scene work and evaluating
162. Farzan, supra note 12.
163. Vogt, supra note 130.
164. See O’Toole & Shay, supra note 128, at 113; see also Cutler, supra note 150, at 20–21.
165. See O’Toole & Shay, supra note 128, at 113, 131–32.
166. See Bernstein, supra note 14; Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11; Farzan, supra note 12.
167. See generally George Reis, Adobe Photoshop Helps Police, 52 LAW & ORDER 70 (2004)
(discussing how police use Photoshop in investigations).
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digital evidence, police turned to Photoshop to aid in the retrieval of eyewitness
identifications. 168 Photoshop can remain a valuable tool for law enforcement
when composing a photo array if used in a way that comports with a suspect’s
due process rights. 169
1. Insert Clothing Items to All Photographs in the Array
One way police can permissibly use Photoshop is by adding articles of
clothing to all the photographs used in the array, as law enforcement did in
United States v. Ellis. 170 This procedure is the technological version of an officer
physically drawing a hat onto a photo, as seen in State v. Simpson. 171 Further,
studies regarding eyewitness confidence have found that the clothing worn by
those in an identification procedure may play a bigger role than physical
appearance in an eyewitness’ processing an identification procedure. 172 The
addition of clothing items allows for a more reliable identification because it
allows witnesses to access what they saw in their memories, and better identify
the culprit. 173 Using Photoshop to add clothing to photo arrays ensures that a
defendant’s due process rights remain protected while also avoiding
misidentification.
By adding these items to all the photographs, the police compose a fairer
lineup by not altering any physical or permanent characteristics of the suspect
as they would do when removing a facial tattoo or scar. As seen in Ellis, the
addition of such items with Photoshop is possible and allows greater protection
of a suspect’s due process rights. 174 This practice better protects due process
because it ensures that the police do not single out a suspect by only altering one
photo contained in the array, thus avoiding the risk of “focusing the witness’s
attention on the single photograph” and using an unnecessarily suggestive
procedure. 175

168. Bogel-Burroughs, supra note 11; Leonetti, supra note 17, at 476.
169. See National Survey, supra note 7, at 117 (commenting that “innovative technologies . . .
might increase the reliability of eyewitness testimony” in identification procedures).
170. United States v. Ellis, 121 F. Supp.3d 927, 934, 944 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Juarez v.
Stainer, No. 11-10410-GW (RZ), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177675, at *5, *28–29 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
29, 2012) (photoshopping beanies to all array photos made suspect’s photo unsuggestive).
171. State v. Simpson, No. 25163, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1585, at *12 (Ct. App. Apr. 26,
2013).
172. See generally R.C. Lindsay et al., Do the Clothes Make the Man? An Exploration of the
Effect of Lineup Attire on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 19 CANADIAN J. OF BEHAV. SCI. 463
(1987).
173. Wise et al., supra note 156, at 850, 865 n.3 (internal citations omitted) (noting that
clothing can act as a “retrieval cue,” or “a stimulus that helps an individual to remember an event”).
174. See Ellis, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 934, 944.
175. Mayer, supra note 92, at 843.
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2. Alter Filler Photographs Only
Besides adding clothing to all the photographs, another permissible
application of photoshopping pictures in arrays is altering filler photos. When a
police officer, like the one in Solomon v. State, faces the challenge of creating a
fair lineup because a suspect has a distinct mark and similar looking fillers are
difficult to locate, it should be just as easy for the technician to add the distinct
mark to the filler photographs and keep the suspect’s photo unchanged. 176 The
Department of Justice recommended the following to federal law enforcement
agencies:
Where the suspect has a unique feature, such as a scar,
tattoo, or mole, or distinctive clothing that would make him
or her stand out in a photo array, filler photographs should
include that unique feature either by selecting fillers who
have such a feature themselves or by altering the
photographs of fillers to the extent necessary to achieve a
consistent appearance. 177
By using Photoshop this way, the police avoid a potential due process
violation—and the risk of a suggestive lineup—because they do not alter the
suspect’s photograph.
Additionally, the Supreme Court requires that an array show individuals
resembling the suspect. 178 If a suspect has a distinct mark, it could logically be
inferred that the police must then find fillers containing similar features. When
the police cannot find such fillers, it is a better practice to alter the filler
photographs rather than the suspect’s, because this ensures both that the witness
sees an actual photograph of the suspect and that the fillers appear similar to the
suspect. 179 If law enforcement cannot find an appropriate filler photograph
when the suspect has a unique feature, and “is nevertheless determined to
conduct a lineup (perhaps for its persuasive appeal to the jury), then researchers
recommend that investigators either artificially create the unique characteristics
on all distractors or cover up those features on all lineup members.” 180
176. See Garza v. State, No. 03-06-00216-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7004, at *6 (App. Sept.
19, 2008) (“Because [the defendant] has a teardrop tattoo under his left eye, to ensure a
representative lineup, [the officer] digitally enhanced three other pictures in the array to show
tattoos under the subjects’ left eyes.”). But see Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. App.
2015) (reasoning that altering fillers instead of the defendant’s photo would not change the
outcome).
177. Yates, supra note 12, at 2.
178. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
179. Eyewitness Identification Task Force, supra note 13, at 37–38.
180. Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A
Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 260 (2000); see also Eyewitness Identification
Task Force, supra note 13, at 38 (recommending that “[t]he administrator should take into account
unique or unusual features, such as scars or tattoos, which can be added or overtly concealed on the
fillers so that all participants or photographs are consistent”).
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B. When Photoshopping Photos in Arrays is Impermissible
While Photoshop assists police in procuring reliable eyewitness
identifications, it also has the potential to violate a defendant’s due process
rights. Such conduct should be found impermissible, and the identifications
resulting from such practices should be excluded.
1. Editing Only the Suspect’s Photograph
One way the use of Photoshop potentially violates due process rights is when
police only alter a suspect’s photograph. 181 All efforts should be made to avoid
altering only the suspect’s photograph as this “procedure would probably violate
due process.” 182 When police only modify the suspect’s photo, they essentially
physically draw on the suspect’s photo and present only one modified
photograph to an eyewitness. 183 This is similar to People v. Slutts where the
court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, showing a witness a
modified photo of a suspect with a drawn-on beard and mustache was
impermissible. 184
Additionally, photoshopping would be impermissible under Manson. Only
photoshopping a suspect’s photo should fail the first prong because this
procedure probably increases “the likelihood of misidentification.” 185 It is
unnecessarily suggestive because police modify only the suspect’s photo and do
so in a way that arguably indicates that the officer believes the suspect is the
culprit. Further, application of reliability factors in the second prong shows that
only photoshopping a suspect’s photo leads to an unreliable identification
because the photograph presented to the witness is not the actual appearance of
the suspect—thus, the witness only identifies a suspect based on a modified
photograph, not on the actual physical appearance. 186 Overall, such a procedure
would be a “photographic identification procedure . . . so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.” 187

181. See United States v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1111, 1114.
182. Mayer, supra note 92, at 843.
183. Compare People v. Slutts, 66 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864–66 (drawing mustaches on the suspect’s
array photo was suggestive) with Chavez v. Gipson, No. 11-7356 AG (FFM), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174099, at *17–19, *22–23 (adding facial hair via photo-editing software to suspect’s photo
only to match filler photos was permissible).
184. Slutts, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 864–66.
185. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
186. See Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Promises and Pitfalls of State Eyewitness Identification
Reforms, 104 KY. L.J. 99, 110 (2016) (“Likewise, if die [sic] suspect stands out in any other
significant way, it is likely to draw witnesses’ attention to him and may suggest that police believe
he is the perpetrator.”).
187. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
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2. Using Photoshop to Match Witnesses’ Descriptions of the Perpetrator
Another way police may use Photoshop improperly is by altering the photo in
a way that matches the witnesses’ descriptions of the culprits. Similar to adding
clothing, the police also use Photoshop to alter a permanent feature of the
defendant, such as a tattoo or scar. 188 Unlike adding clothing, however, altering
permanent features should be impermissible. While a witness may not describe
the culprit as having a unique mark, like a tattoo, police justify the removal of
such features because retaining them would make the suspect stand out. 189
However, it could be argued that the police officer’s “Photoshop job had a
different motivation: It [makes the suspect] look more like the perpetrator[,]”
and produces an arguably unreliable identification. 190
For instance, in United States v. Allen, the surveillance footage clearly showed
that the robber had no visible facial tattoos. 191 Additionally, none of the
witnesses described seeing a facial tattoo. 192 However, the main suspect had a
visible facial tattoo, and the police removed it from his photo used in the
lineup. 193 The police equated the removal of the suspect’s tattoos to “applying
electronic makeup” because investigators believed the robber disguised
himself. 194 Altering a photograph to make the suspect appear similar to the
footage and consistent with the witnesses’ descriptions, then justifying this
because of an alleged disguise, is impermissible and violates due process
because there is a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” a
danger the Supreme Court has persistently tried to abolish. 195
Additionally, the practice of editing a suspect’s photograph is impermissible
because the Supreme Court requires an array to include individuals who appear
similar to the suspect—not similar to an eyewitness’ description. 196 When the
police edit how a suspect looks in a photo and it comports with what an
eyewitness remembers seeing, this could influence the witness to pick the
suspect’s photo, although the edited image does not actually match the suspect’s
appearance. 197 Instead of making a fairer, unsuggestive procedure, the goal of
188. See United States v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1111 (D. Or. 2019) (photoshopping out
facial and neck tattoos from defendant’s photo before compiling lineup); United States v. Martinez,
No. 11-16-GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at *8 n.3 (D. Del. July 25, 2012) (photoshopping
out defendant’s facial tattoo); Solomon v. State, 469 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tex. App. 2015) (using
software to remove defendant’s facial tattoos).
189. See Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1111; Martinez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103608, at *8 n.3;
Solomon, 469 S.W.3d at 644.
190. Farzan, supra note 12.
191. Id. (discussing Allen)
192. Id.
193. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.
194. Id.
195. See discussion supra Section I.B.
196. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
197. See John T. Wixted & Gary L. Wells, The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence
and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis, 18 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 10, 16 (2017).
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the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, editing in this manner actually allows police
to partake in a suggestive practice that the Supreme Court heavily criticized in
its numerous rulings. 198 Such a practice should not stand.
V. CONCLUSION
With police officers using new technology to investigate crimes, it is
understandable why they would use programs such as Photoshop in
identification procedures. However, with courts rarely holding such practices
as impermissible, there is no telling how far this practice will continue.
Eventually, courts need to realize that constitutional rights are being threatened
in favor of keeping the current due process test alive. Until a better standard is
established, police should avoid using problematic methods such as
photoshopping a suspect’s photo.

198. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 248 (2012); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972).
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